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Pharmaceutical counterfeiting is a growing area of public 
safety and national security concern. Biological medications are a 
growing portion of counterfeit medicines due to the high cost and 
opportunities for profit from these innovative drugs. Biologics are a 
unique target for counterfeiters in international commerce presenting 
unique hazards over traditional, more stable, pills. This Article explores 
the international biopharmaceutical supply chain and the regulatory 
weaknesses that compromise public health. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Pharmaceutical counterfeiting is a gravely important problem due to the 
public safety risks of a compromised medicine supply chain. This Article 
will explore how biopharmaceuticals, innovative and costly medicines, have a 
heightened risk of counterfeiting and the paths by which counterfeits end up 
in doctors’ offices. Following a test case exploring the distribution supply 
chain, we will see that lax efforts to police the gray market of 
pharmaceutical parallel imports have compromised patient safety in the 
United States (U.S.), which has a robust regulatory and drug safety regime. 
The international medicinal supply chain is a complex network of 
suppliers, distributors, and doctors helping patients and making a living 
in a non-harmonized international marketplace. Prescription drugs may be 
manufactured abroad and pass though many nations with different standards 
before reaching critically ill patients. Without a unified global regulatory 
system and deterrent penalties, criminals take advantage of a high priced 
marketplace compromising the security of the drug supply system. 
Using the biologic drug Avastin as the test case, this Article will look 
at the statutory manufacturing and importation schemes of the U.S., Canada, 
European Union (E.U.), and Turkey to see how a counterfeit drug passed 
through many hands before administration to American cancer patients. 
The response to that incident is weighed and recent legal developments 
analyzed. Finally, this Article will propose recommendations for monitoring 
and securing the pharmaceutical supply chain to target regulatory weaknesses. 
II.  COUNTERFEITING IN PHARMACEUTICALS 
The World Health Organization (WHO) previously estimated that 10% 
of the global pharmaceutical market is counterfeit.1 However, the WHO 
 
 1.  Bill Berkot, Fake Avastin shows little protection of drug supply, REUTERS (Mar. 
12, 2012, 1:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-avastin-drug-fake-idUSBRE82B0 
YY20120312. 
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warns against reporting such shocking figures because there are many 
variables in assessing the extent of pharmaceutical counterfeiting.2 The 
pervasiveness of counterfeits in the marketplace varies widely by region.3 
Industrial nations have less than 1% counterfeit penetration.4 The problem 
can reach 30% or more of the marketplace in developing countries.5 
Counterfeiting is likely underestimated and often goes unreported due to 
difficulties in measuring the problem.6 Counterfeiters actively conceal their 
involvement and cover up crimes hindering assessment.7 
Criminals driven by financial gain are involved in all facets of the illicit 
medicine supply chain, including manufacturing and distribution.8 The 
international regulatory framework is also ill equipped to protect against 
terrorist organizations playing a role in the marketplace.9 The ease of entry 
into the marketplace and opportunity to make large profits encourages 
counterfeiters. 
This Article is concerned with medication counterfeits and tampered 
medications rather than intellectual property misappropriation, also commonly 
identified as a counterfeiting issue. Awareness of intellectual property 
issues plays a role in identifying counterfeits. As this Article will show, 
misuse of trademark and packaging standards raised red flags for practitioners 
who attempted further investigation of medication that turned out to be 
fake. The labeling was a telltale giveaway of counterfeiting and easily 
detectable as the fake drugs moved through the supply chain. 
 
 2.  INT’L MEDICINAL PRODUCTS ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TASKFORCE [IMPACT], 
COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES: AN UPDATE ON ESTIMATES (Nov. 15, 2006), http://www.who. 
int/medicines/services/counterfeit/impact/TheNewEstimatesCounterfeit.pdf. 
 3.  Id. (Within geographic regions, there may also be large differences in urban 
versus rural counterfeit rates.). 
 4.  CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION [CDC], COUNTERFEIT DRUGS, 
http://www.cdc.gov/features/counterfeitdrugs/ (last updated Apr. 7, 2014). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  See Tim K. Mackey et al., Counterfeit Drug Penetration into Global Legitimate 
Medicine Supply Chains: A Global Assessment, 92 AM. J. TROP. MED. HYGIENE 59, 59–60 
(2015). 
 7.  IMPACT, supra note 2. 
 8.  INTERPOL, PHARMACEUTICAL CRIME AND ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUPS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUPS IN PHARMACEUTICAL 
CRIME SINCE 2008, at 5 (2014). 
 9.  See Douglas T. Cannon, War Through Pharmaceuticals: How Terrorist Organizations 
are Turning to Counterfeit Medicine to Fund Their Illicit Activity, 47 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 
343 (2015) (discussing how terrorists may use the lax pharmaceutical regulatory environment 
as a funding opportunity). 
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“We should not get confused by so many other terms, which have 
hindered the movement in councils of discussion,” said Joel Breman, 
senior scientist emeritus at the National Institute of Health.10 There is 
currently no uniform international definition of a counterfeit drug.11 Previously, 
the WHO defined a counterfeit drug as “a pharmaceutical product whose 
origin and/or identity specifications have been deliberately and fraudulently 
modified.”12 Today, the WHO encourages using the expression Substandard, 
Spurious, Falsely labeled, Falsified and Counterfeit (SSFFC) Medical Products 
to describe the range of goods that endanger public health.13 U.S. law defines 
counterfeit drugs as those sold under a product name without proper 
authorization.14 Counterfeit products may include products without the 
active pharmaceutical ingredient (API), with an insufficient or excessive 
quantity of the API, containing the wrong API, or with unlicensed packaging.15 
Under U.S. law, a counterfeit drug can be a drug or its packaging with 
misleading features or falsely purporting to be the licensed and genuine 
product.16 Misrepresentation of drugs is a broad category taking many 
forms. Complete fakes are counterfeits manufactured with no genuine 
medicinal components or API.17 This Article explores the counterfeiting 
incident where the injectable cancer drug Avastin was a complete counterfeit 
containing no therapeutic ingredient benefiting cancer victims.18 Patients 
receiving it experienced severe reactions; they began to shake and needed 
 
 10.  Bea Perks, Pharmaceutical Fakes: A Dangerous Pandemic, PHARMACEUTICAL 
JOURNAL (May 21, 2015), http://www.pharmaceutical-journal.com/news-and-analysis/features/ 
pharmaceutical-fakes-a-dangerous-pandemic/20068533.article. 
 11.  WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], SSFFC – FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http:// 
www.who.int/medicines/regulation/ssffc/faq-ssffc_11-18/en/index4.html (last visited Nov. 
11, 2016). 
 12.  UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE RESEARCH INST. [UNICRI], 
ORGANIZED CRIME STRATEGIES IN THE PRODUCTION AND TRADE OF COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES 2, 
http://www.unicri.it/topics/counterfeiting/medicines/savemed/D7.1_OC_Strategies_2013.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2016). 
 13.  WHO, supra note 11; see also Gian Luca Burci, Public Health and “Counterfeit” 
Medicines: The Role of the World Health Organization, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. (Jan. 11, 
2013), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/2/public-health-and-%E2%80%9C 
counterfeit%E2%80%9D-medicines-role-world-health-organization (distinguishing the 
public health issue of counterfeit drugs from traditional intellectual property violations). 
 14.  U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. [FDA], COUNTERFEIT DRUGS QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm169898.htm (last updated Apr. 27, 
2011). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  21 U.S.C. § 321 (2006). 
 17.  See Maria Nelson, Michelle Vizurraga & David Chang, Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals: 
A Worldwide Problem, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 1068, 1073–74 (2006). 
 18.  Christopher Weaver & Jeanne Whalen, How Fake Cancer Drugs Entered the 
U.S., WALL ST. J. (July 20, 2012, 3:02 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240 
52702303879604577410430607090226. 
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to be disconnected from the sham treatment.19 The container was also 
phony, bearing the Turkish brand name Alzutan with English language 
packaging, a combination not seen in the genuine pharmaceutical.20 
There are also tampered fakes having a genuine component, such as the 
package or label, but are altered in another way.21 Tampered fakes may be 
diluted drugs that are less potent than the label asserts.22 A re-labeled 
counterfeit may contain authentic drug, but with the expiration date altered, 
misrepresenting the drug’s safety and effectiveness.23 In January 2013, 
police in Colombia arrested 21 pharmaceutical counterfeiting suspects.24 
A total of 89,754 medications were seized from an organized crime group 
falsifying the expiration dates and batch numbers.25 This type of counterfeiting 
undermines the quality control system that ensures effectiveness of drug 
products. 
Through another type of counterfeiting, diverted fakes illegally enter 
the pharmaceutical market through theft or diversion.26 Criminal groups 
specializing in robbery steal and resell medication to secondary distributors 
and wholesalers, or, many times, directly to pharmacists.27 A common 
example of diversion is antimalarial medicine in African markets, where 
diversion by theft of legitimate medication can lead to serious stock shortages, 
endangering public health in countries with high numbers of infected 
patients.28 
Counterfeiting pharmaceuticals is an attractive and lucrative opportunity 
for criminals. For organized crime groups involved in pharmaceutical 
 
 19.  John Roth, Counterfeit Drugs: Prosecuting the Profiteers, FDA VOICE (July 15, 
2013), http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2013/07/counterfeit-drugs-prosecuting-the- 
profiteers-protecting-the-public-health/. 
 20.  Ben Hirschler, New Batch of Fake Avastin Reached U.S. via Britain (Apr. 5, 
2012, 2:54 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/us-avastin-fake-idUSBRE8 
3407D20120405. 
 21.  See Nelson, Vizurraga & Chang, supra note 17, at 1073–74. 
 22.  CMS, The Problem—The Patent and Brand Thief (Jan. 6, 2005), http://www. 
cms-cmck.com/newsmedia/news/newsdetail/pages/default.aspx?PublicationGuid=1e964 
0c5-7435-47d3-a5f5-d0551ef0f487. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  INTERPOL, supra note 8, at 8. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 13. 
 27.  Id. (for example, in late 2011, Brazil’s Internal Affairs Division seized 61 boxes 
of stolen medications at legitimate clinics in Sao Paulo). 
 28.  Id. 
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wrongdoing, there is often no need to resort to violence.29 Unlike criminals 
dealing exclusively with illegal drugs such as heroin and cocaine, 
counterfeiting medicine allows counterfeiters to keep a low profile and 
avoid law enforcement authorities.30 
Some countries face legislative challenges to thwarting pharmaceutical 
crime, as few countries possess specific legislation to target this type of 
counterfeiting crime.31 Furthermore, many countries indicate that poor 
penalties are a contributing factor for the proliferation of criminal networks.32 
For example, in the U.S., distributors, doctors, and their staff may receive 
only probation for providing unapproved drugs and knowingly risking the 
health and safety of patients trusting them to give quality care.33 
Criminal groups involved in medicine counterfeiting vary in their level 
of proficiency. Poor drug imitation packaging may include misspellings 
and a combination of different languages.34 High-quality counterfeits are 
more difficult to distinguish from genuine versions.35 The more sophisticated 
the product, the more sophisticated the criminals responsible for the forgery. 
For example, an international organized crime group based in the U.K., 
and dismantled in late 2011, produced counterfeit erectile dysfunction tablets, 
physically identical to the genuine drug, also containing API.36 
The Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI) manages a secure database 
recording incidents of counterfeiting, theft, and illegal diversion of 
pharmaceutical products worldwide.37 The number of counterfeiting incidents 
recorded has risen nearly 60% over the last decade.38 As drug counterfeiting 
continues to set records, biologic counterfeiting has room to grow.39 
 
 29.  Id. at 12. 
 30.  Id. (discussing how the comparatively low level of violence lowers barriers to 
entry). 
 31.  Id. at 16. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  See Press Release, FBI, Greeneville Oncologist and Practice Manager Sentenced for 
Violating Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (June 12, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/knoxville/ 
press-releases/2014/greeneville-oncologist-and-practice-manager-sentenced-for-violating-food- 
drug-and-cosmetic-act. 
 34.  See Peter Spinella, Russian Ex-Cop Runs $670,000 Counterfeit Drug Factory at 
Home, MOSCOW TIMES (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/ 
ex-cop-runs-bogus-drug-plant-at-home/452818.html. 
 35.  INTERPOL, supra note 8, at 12. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  PHARMACEUTICAL SECURITY INST., COUNTERFEIT SITUATION, http://www.psi-inc. 
org/counterfeitsituation.cfm (last visited Feb. 2, 2016). 
 38.  See generally Thomas T. Kubic, Beer Cooler Biologics: The Dangers of Counterfeit 
Drugs, THE POLICE CHIEF, Aug. 2008, at 44–48. 
 39.  Patricia Van Arnum, Tracking Growth in Biologics, 37 PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. 
(2013), http://www.pharmtech.com/tracking-growth-biologics; see also Cormac Sheridan, 
Bad Medicine, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 707, 707 (2007), http://www.nature.com/nbt/ 
journal/v25/n7/full/nbt0707-707.html. 
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Increased demand for high priced biological treatments will surely attract 
more attention from counterfeiters adept at profiting off public demand 
for new pharmaceutical advancements. 
III.  BIOPHARMACEUTICALS 
A class of treatments called biopharmaceuticals, or biologics, currently 
drives biomedical research and development.40 Biologics are responsible 
for breakthroughs in treating cancer, HIV, and other illnesses.41 Biologics 
are pharmaceuticals made from natural sources including vaccines, gene 
therapies, antibodies, and blood products.42 Biologic treatments differ from 
traditional drugs, which are chemically synthesized.43 
In the U.S., the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates manufacture 
and labeling of biologics.44 Like all medications in the U.S., biological 
products go through FDA review prior to market approval.45  The time between 
discovery of a new drug and the moment that drug reaches the consumer 
takes an average of 12 to 13 years.46 On average, only one or two substances 
developed in the laboratory will successfully pass all stages of development 
to become a marketable medicine.47 
The ultimate high cost of treatment reflects the difficulties of the 
manufacturing process and the complexity of biologic products.48 The 
average cost of creating a new biological entity in 2012 was $1.5 billion.49 
 
 40.  U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. [FDA], WHAT IS A BIOLOGICAL PRODUCT?, http:// 
www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194516.htm (last updated Aug. 20, 2015). 
 41.  Michael C. Barnes & Stacey L. Worthy, Applying Lessons from the Opioid Abuse 
Epidemic to Protect Consumers from Gray Market Biologics, 29 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 375, 377 (2015), http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1753&context=ndjlepp. 
 42.  U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. [FDA], What are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/C
BER/ucm133077.htm (last updated Aug. 5, 2015). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  21 C.F.R. § 600 et seq. (2015). 
 45.  21 U.S.C. § 355 (2015). 
 46.  EUROPEAN FEDERATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INDS. AND ASS’NS [EFPIA], THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN FIGURES 6 (2014), http://www.efpia.eu/uploads/Figures_ 
2014_Final.pdf. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Andrew Wasson, Taking Biologics for Granted? Takings, Trade Secrets, and 
Off-Patent Biological Products, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. ¶ 1, ¶ 2 (2005), http://www.law. 
duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2005dltr0004.html. 
 49.  EFPIA, supra note 46, at 6. 
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Treatments of biologic drug Avastin could cost cancer patients over 
$100,000 per year in 2008.50 In 2010, some biologics cost over $2,000 per 
dose.51 Drug companies have a tremendous interest in protecting research 
and development investments and the goodwill of their brands with such 
large stakes involved.52 The market for biologics is growing rapidly.53 
Projections indicate biologics will make up 20% of the pharmaceutical 
market by 2017.54 Increasing demand for the high-priced medicinal products 
makes the biologics market susceptible to counterfeiters seeking to exploit 
a vulnerable and desperate patient population. 
The WHO advises that quality assurance of biological medicines is 
necessary.55 Safety considerations particular to biopharmaceuticals involve 
the biological nature of the raw materials used, the manufacturing process, 
and the tests and methods safeguarding production consistency.56 It is 
problematic to detect counterfeit biologics because injectable versions 
may consist of a white powder similar to legitimate medicine in smell, taste, 
or appearance.57 Biologics are less stable than chemical pharmaceuticals.58 
There is a greater risk of instability, ineffectiveness, and contamination 
when biologics are not stored properly.59 They are prone to degradation 
 
 50.  Leigh Purvis, Biologics in Perspective: A Case for Generic Biologic Drugs, 
AARP PUBLIC POL’Y INST. 1 (2009), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/fs155_ 
biologics.pdf (Biologic drug sales in 2007 totaled $75 billion. See chart for Avastin and 
top biologic sales compared to the cost of research and development.); Gina Kolata & 
Andrew Pollack, Costly Cancer Drug Offers Hope, but Also a Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES (July 
6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/06/health/06avastin.html?_r=0. 
 51.  Hutton et al., Switching to Less Expensive Blindness Drug Could Save Medicare 
Part B Over $18 Billion Over a Ten-Year Period, 33 HEALTH AFFAIRS 931, 931 (2014), 
http://www.ascrs.org/sites/default/files/1453_001.pdf; DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, MEDICARE PAYMENTS FOR DRUGS USED TO TREAT WET AGE- 
RELATED MACULAR DEGENERATION 11 (2012),  http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-10-00360. 
pdf (contractor’s payments differed by as much as 28%). 
 52.  See Cormac Sheridan, Bad Medicine, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 707, 707 (2007), 
http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v25/n7/full/nbt0707-707.html. 
 53.  Simon King, The Best Selling Drugs Since 1996 - Why AbbVie’s Humira Is Set 
To Eclipse Pfizer’s Lipitor, FORBES (July 15, 2013, 8:34 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
simonking/2013/07/15/the-best-selling-drugs-since-1996-why-abbvies-humira-is-set-to-eclipse- 
pfizers-lipitor/. 
 54.  See IMS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, THE GLOBAL USE OF MEDICINES: 
OUTLOOK THROUGH 2017 9 (2013), http://www.quotidianosanita.it/allegati/allegato1501 
906.pdf. 
 55.  Kubic, supra note 38. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Ravi Kalyanaraman et al., Screening and Detecting Counterfeit Biologics Drugs, 2 
BIOPHARMA ASIA 58, 58 (2013). 
 58.  Thomas Morrow & Linda Hull Felcone, Defining the Difference: What Makes 
Biologics Unique, 1 BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE 24, 28 (2004), http://www.ncbi.nlm. 
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3564302/pdf/bh0104024.pdf. 
 59.  FDA, supra note 42. 
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from exposure to light and typically require refrigeration to maintain 
potency.60 These storage safety requirements pose problems for biologics 
manufactured on one continent and transported to another. 
For example, in 2014, Ozkan Semizoglu, a Turkish drug wholesaler, was 
sentenced to 27 months in prison for smuggling counterfeit, misbranded, 
and adulterated cancer treatment drugs to the U.S.61 Semizoglu shipped 
biologic cancer treatments requiring cold storage without any temperature 
controls from Turkey to the state of Missouri.62 The exporter was aware 
the medications would arrive in the U.S. without the constant cold temperature 
range needed to maintain drug quality and stability.63 Even legitimate drugs 
shipped under these conditions would not be effective treatments after such a 
journey heightening the risk to sick patients. 
Biologic counterfeits are a concern spanning the globe. The following 
are just some of the examples of biologic counterfeiting incidents: 
 In 2004, Florida authorities arrested suspects selling pharmaceutical 
counterfeits including diluted Procrit and Epogen, biologics 
used to boost immune systems in cancer and AIDS patients.64 The 
suspects made millions in illegal profits using the illicit proceeds 
to purchase a strip club.65 They continued selling phony medications 
out of the strip club, storing the sham medicine in beer coolers.66 
 In 2006, Brazil’s pharmaceutical regulator recalled counterfeit 
flu vaccines marked with the brand name Fluarix.67 The manufacturer 
responsible for the genuine Fluarix biologic stopped marketing 
the vaccine under that name two years earlier.68 The discovery 
came just as a nationwide campaign to inoculate 18 million 
Brazilians began.69 
 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Turkish Man Sentenced for Smuggling 
Counterfeit Cancer Drugs (June 18, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ 
ucm420869.htm. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Bob LaMendola, 2 Charged in Phony Drug Scheme, SUN SENTINEL (May 28, 
2004), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2004-05-28/news/0405280185_1_strip-club-cancer- 
drugs-club-employees. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Kubic, supra note 38. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
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 In 2011 and 2012, Chinese authorities carried out raids and made 
arrests when an organized crime group delivered counterfeit and 
diverted human growth hormone (HGH) products to local 
subcontractors.70 
IV.  PARALLEL IMPORTING 
Parallel importing is the practice of purchasing and importing legitimate 
goods not intended for use in a regional market, usually at a substantial 
price discount.71 Manufactured abroad, the imported goods bear a genuine 
trademark.72 Importers of unauthorized goods mistakenly believe that the 
gray market of parallel importation is a legitimate business.73 However, 
the unauthorized flow of goods jeopardizes quality standards and projects 
a false sense of security in consumers.74 
Legitimate pharmaceuticals licensed for use in other countries are not 
approved for sale in the U.S. by parallel importing.75 Even if the Avastin 
counterfeits were genuine medications, the goods are illegal in the U.S. 
because they were not made in approved facilities or packaged with FDA 
approved labeling.76 No new drug may enter the U.S. market, by new drug 
approval or importation, without FDA approval of both safety and 
effectiveness.77 The Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) prohibits 
importation of unapproved drugs.78 Unapproved drugs are medications, 
including foreign-made versions of U.S. approved drugs not manufactured in 
accordance with and pursuant to FDA approval.79 
High drug prices in the U.S. create the opportunity for parallel importers 
to take advantage of price discrepancies between the U.S. and other 
nations.80 Parallel importation of pharmaceuticals between countries with 
highly developed regulatory systems trade on established goodwill and 
 
 70.  INTERPOL, supra note 8, at 9. 
 71.  Frances P. Hadfield, Who’s on the Hook? (and Who Can Afford the Hook Anyway?): 
Responding to Customs and Border Protection’s Requests for Factual Informa tion: 
Responsibilities, Burdens, and Consequences, 23 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 331, 345 (2015). 
 72.  Id. at 344. 
 73.  Id. at 345. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2015). 
 76.  Benoît Faucon & Jeanne Whalen, Fake Avastin Took Murky Path to U.S., WALL 
ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2012, 8:31 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303302 
504577323500453577094. 
 77.  See NIELSON, infra note 157, at 28. 
 78.  21 U.S.C. § 331 et seq. (2015). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Lucy J. Minehan, The Gray Market: A Call for Greater Protection of Consumers 
and Trademark Owners, 12 U. PA. J. INT’L. BUS. L. 457, 457 (1991). 
ABMA (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2017  2:19 PM 
[VOL. 18:  161, 2016]  Bitter Biopharmaceuticals 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 171 
quality of reputation.81 However, public policy prohibits parallel importing 
from nations with weak regulatory standards. This is because drugs sold 
abroad may be subject to less stringent regulation and testing, posing health 
risks if not properly assessed in a rigorous regulatory environment.82 
Addressing public health inequity in trade practices, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) administered the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).83 The TRIPS Agreement contains 
provisions ensuring public health needs are addressed through international 
trade.84 Parallel importing cannot be challenged and is effectively a matter 
of national discretion.85 TRIPS “does not and should not prevent Members 
from taking measures to protect public health.”86 This emphasizes a nation’s 
ability to utilize compulsory licensing and parallel importation of legitimate 
drugs.87 International trade agreements often limit the flexibilities provided 
for by TRIPS in the name of public health.88 Both the E.U. and U.S. limit 
the scope of parallel importation.89 
Limitations on pharmaceutical parallel importing are an attempt to 
prevent weak spots from compromising the supply chain. While some 
encourage gray market purchasing to keep costs down, as Minnesota did 
when implementing the ConnectRx program, the unique hazards associated 
with biopharmaceuticals highlight the need for further scrutiny. 
  
 
 81.  Id. at 458. 
 82.  See Summit Tech. v. High-Line Med. Instruments, 922 F. Supp. 918, 936–37 
(C.D. Cal. 1996). 
 83.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 
Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 
 84.  See MDG GAP TASK FORCE, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL 8: THE GLOBAL 
PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT: MAKING RHETORIC A REALITY, at xvi, U.N. Sales No. 
E.12.II.C.5 (2012). 
 85.  WORLD TRADE ORG. [WTO], FACT SHEET: TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 
OBLIGATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS (2006), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet 
_pharm02_e.htm. 
 86.  Roma Patel, A Public Health Imperative: The Need for Meaningful Change in 
the Trans-Pacific Partnerships Intellectual Property Chapter, 16 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 
477, 488 (2015). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 488–89. 
 89.  MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÉRES, TRIPS, TRIPS Plus and Doha (last updated Jul. 
2011), http://www.msfaccess.org/content/trips-trips-plus-and-doha. 
ABMA (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2017  2:19 PM 
 
172 
V.  THE AVASTIN CASE: HOW BIOLOGIC COUNTERFEITS                     
INFILTRATED DOCTORS’ OFFICES 
“The Avastin case was a watershed moment for law enforcement to 
recognize that this is not a problem that can be restricted to one part of the 
world,” said Ronald Noble, Secretary-General of the international police 
organization INTERPOL.90 Avastin is a life-saving cancer treatment also 
known as Altuzan, the product’s Turkish name.91 First approved in 2004, 
Avastin was developed by Genentech, an American subsidiary of Roche, 
to treat metastatic cancers.92 The injectable biopharmaceutical is a monoclonal 
antibody, which inhibits blood vessel forming growth factors, effectively 
choking off blood supply to tumors.93 Avastin is on the WHO’s list of 
Essential Medicines, indicating its importance to public health.94 
In early 2012, the FDA warned 20 U.S. medical practices that they may 
have obtained counterfeit versions of Avastin. This was the first discovery 
in the U.S. of a counterfeit cancer drug administered in physicians’ offices.95 
The fake injectable contained cornstarch, acetone, and other chemicals, but 
no cancer-fighting ingredients.96 By the end of the investigation, the FDA 
sent almost 1,000 warning letters to 48 states warning of the dangerous 
counterfeit.97 
The Avastin counterfeits took a long, international route to the United 
States. The fake drugs originated in Turkey and were exported by Ozay 
Pharmaceuticals (Ozay), which shipped supplies to over 70 countries.98 
Sometimes, the fake Avastin shipped directly from Turkey to the United 
States.99 Other times, the counterfeit pharmaceuticals took a circuitous route, 
 
 90.  Weaver, supra note 18. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Genentech, Product Information (last visited Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.gene. 
com/media/product-information/avastin-colorectal. 
 93.  See FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. [FDA], FDA News Release (Feb. 26, 2004), 
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/2004/ucm108252.htm. 
 94.  WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], WHO MODEL LIST OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 42 
(2015), http://www.who.int/selection_medicines/committees/expert/20/EML_2015_FINAL_ 
amended_AUG2015.pdf?ua=1. 
 95.  Weaver, supra note 18. 
 96.  See id. 
 97.  See Tim K. Mackey et al., After counterfeit Avastin®—what have we learned 
and what can be done?, 12 NATURE REVS. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 302, 302 (2015), http:// 
www.nature.com/nrclinonc/journal/v12/n5/abs/nrclinonc.2015.35.html. 
 98.  See Lecia Bushak, Turkish Man, Owner Of Ozay Pharmaceuticals Admits To 
Importing Illegal Cancer Drugs Into US, MEDICAL DAILY (Aug. 16, 2014, 4:55 PM), 
http://www.medicaldaily.com/turkish-man-owner-ozay-pharmaceuticals-admits-importing- 
illegal-cancer-drugs-us-298366. 
 99.  See Jeanne Whalen, Turkish Drug Exporter Ozay Draws U.S. Scrutiny, WALL 
ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2014, 7:46 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023035 
46204579435692215579758 (noting that Sabahaddin Akman, owner of Ozay Pharmaceuticals 
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shipping from Ozay to River East Supplies in the United Kingdom,100 then 
to Canada Drugs in Canada, and then finally to Montana Healthcare 
Solutions in the United States.101 While Ozay sometimes sent legitimate 
drugs unlicensed for use in the U.S., other times it shipped complete fakes 
containing water and mold.102  Ozay also sent biologic shipments without 
proper protections to keep the sensitive drugs at a constant cold temperature 
required for drug stability.103 The company also mislabeled shipments 
calling them “gifts” or “product samples” to avoid detection by customs 
officials.104 These parallel import transgressions undermine safety regulations 
intended to protect patients. 
By 2011, U.S. doctors could no longer make a living purchasing the drug 
from legitimate U.S. suppliers due to Medicare and insurance companies 
reducing payments.105 A vial of Avastin cost about $2,400;106 a year’s worth 
of treatment could exceed $100,000.107 Doctors began purchasing counterfeit 
Avastin from U.S. drug wholesaler Montana Healthcare Solutions at deep 
discounts.108 Ironically, Minnesota reacted to high drug prices in 2004 by 
connecting residents with state-approved foreign pharmacies through the 
Minnesota RXConnect online drug importation program.109 Minnesota 
inspected and approved pharmacies despite warnings from the FDA about 
 
pled guilty to importing counterfeit drugs into the U.S. after a sting in Puerto Rico, and 
numerous agencies were involved in the apprehension; Akman claimed the drug shipments 
were gifts to avoid raising suspicion by customs officials). 
 100.  See id.; see also Weaver, supra note 18. 
 101.  See Weaver, supra note 18. 
 102.  See Jeanne Whalen, Arrests in Cancer Drug Sales, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2014, 6:26 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304703804579383271726960510. 
 103.   See S. Imber, Man Imported Fake Cancer Drugs From Turkey Gets 2 Years and 
3 Months in Prison, PARTNERSHIP FOR SAFE MEDICINES (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.safe 
medicines.org/2014/11/man-imported-fake-cancer-drugs-from-turkey-gets-2-years-and-3-
months-in-prison-11-4-14.html (providing graphic for regional scope of indictments and 
guilty verdicts). 
 104.  See id. 
 105.  See Weaver, supra note 18. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  A. Jirillo, F. Vascon & M. Giacobbo, Bevacizumab in advanced cancer, too much 
or too little?, 19 ANNALS OF  ONCOLOGY 1817, 1817 (2008), http://annonc.oxfordjournals. 
org/content/19/10/1817.full. 
 108.  See Weaver, supra note 18. 
 109.  Kevin Goodno & Karen Janisch, Minnesota: Leading the Way on Canadian 
Prescription Medicine Importation, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 811, 814 (2005). 
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the risk.110 For example, Minnesota added Canada Drugs, a suspect supplier 
discussed below, to the approved list111 even though representatives from 
other states had concerns.112 The RXConnect program eventually ended 
in 2010.113 
Montana Healthcare Solutions was one of many subsidiaries controlled 
by Mr. Kris Thorkelson.114 Also known by other names, Montana Healthcare 
Solutions was part of the supply chain consisting of a maze of subsidiaries 
importing medicines from the international gray market controlled by Mr. 
Thorkelson to obfuscate the origin of drug shipments.115 Founding 
pharmaceutical distributor Canada Drugs in 2001, the company at first 
sold medications obtained solely from Canadian suppliers; however, within 
a decade it began importing drugs from questionable sources.116 
The fake Avastin was likely manufactured in Turkey and traveled through 
Europe before importation into Canada, where it was sold to doctors in the 
U.S.117 In 2012, Montana Health Solutions, which sold the fake Avastin 
to U.S. doctors, procured the drug through a company founded by Mr. 
Thorkelson’s brother-in-law known as River East Supplies, a U.K. 
wholesaler obtaining cheap medications from locations such as India and 
Turkey.118 The wholesaler from Turkey was not registered with Turkish 
authorities as a pharmaceutical exporter as required by law.119 Investigations 
later revealed that there was no pharmaceutical exporter at the Turkish address 
on the invoices; rather, the location was home to a textiles factory.120 
 
 110.  Helkei Tinsley, Current Public Law and Policy Issues: Prescriptions without 
Borders: America Looks to Canada for Answers to Solve the Prescription Drug Pricing 
Predicament in the U.S., but is Importation Really the Solution?, 25 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & 
POL’Y 437, 465, 470–71 (2004). 
 111.  Two Pharmacies Added to Minnesota RxConnect Web Site, CAPITOL REP. (June 
21, 2004), http://politicsinminnesota.com/2004/06/two-pharmacies-added-to-minnesota- 
rxconnect-web-site/; see also Fred Schneyer, MN Starting Canadian Pharmacy Inspections, 
PLAN SPONSOR (Mar. 5, 2004), http://www.plansponsor.com/MN-Starting-Canadian-Pharmacy- 
Inspections/. 
 112.  John M. Taylor, III, Associate Comm’r for Regulatory Affairs, Food & Drug 
Admin., Address Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations: Importation of Prescription 
Drugs (July 22, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm113635.htm. 
 113.  Minnesota ends prescription importation program, AM. MED. NEWS (Jan. 29, 
2010), http://www.amednews.com/article/20100129/business/301299997/8/. 
 114.  See Weaver, supra note 18. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  See id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Faucon, supra note 76. 
 120.  Id. 
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A second wave of fake Avastin later entered the U.S. in spite of ongoing 
investigations.121 In this case, the counterfeits likely originated in Egypt.122 
Once again, River East Supplies, the U.K. wholesaler that imported the initial 
batches of counterfeit Avastin, continued importing more fake medication.123 
Another faulty link in the supply chain, Richard’s Pharma, a licensed 
U.K. wholesaler, originally procured the counterfeit medicine from a Turkish 
wholesaler, exporting nearly a third of the counterfeit inventory directly 
to the United States.124 The remaining counterfeits were sold to River East 
Supplies, which also imported the fakes to the United States.125 A director 
at River East Supplies said the company only buys drugs from “regulated 
supply channels and through licensed wholesalers.”126 Hazardous counterfeits 
crossed borders without repercussion even though the companies were already 
on alert from the previous counterfeiting incident. 
At least 76 doctors in 22 states purchased the counterfeit Avastin.127 The 
drugs came through many suppliers and distributors affiliated with Canada 
Drugs.128 The genuine manufacturer and U.S. government responded with 
public education campaigns, including publishing identification tips on 
the Internet.129 The counterfeits were easily identifiable due to inconsistencies 
in the packaging, which readily indicated a lack of approval in the United 
States.130 
A California physician who received the counterfeits said that he was 
unaware the drugs were not FDA-approved because the suppliers had 
valid wholesaler licenses from U.S. state regulators.131 When customers 
expressed concerns to Canada Drugs that the medication originated in 
Turkey, they were told that “every country has a standard they have to pass 
and some of those countries have stricter standards than the U.S.”132 
 
 121.  See id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  See Weaver, supra note 18. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  See Genentech Statement on Counterfeit Drug Labeled as Altuzan (Bevacizumab) 
in the United States, GENENTECH (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.gene.com/media/statements/ 
ps_020713. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  See Weaver, supra note 18. 
 132.  Id. In a related incident, a Swiss distributor ordered what it thought to be the 
genuine drug from an Egyptian company called Sawa, a company unregistered with Egypt’s 
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While pharmaceutical wholesalers are not in a position to perform testing 
for purity and strength by analytical standards, they can take reasonable 
precautions to verify that shipments are legitimate. Reasonable precautions 
include examining the packaging for inconsistencies, such as multiple 
languages, and ensuring use of appropriate cold storage during transport. 
These basic precautions can be utilized by a simple inspection when shipments 
are received. However, in spite of the heightened risk of importing from 
countries with lax regulatory schemes, and in the face of inconsistent product 
packaging, the counterfeits went undetected until reaching doctors’ offices in 
the United States. 
The U.S. government prosecuted both doctors and importers responsible 
for the fake Avastin supplies. The owner of Montana Health Solutions, 
Mr. Paul Bottomley, was sentenced to house arrest and five years of 
probation.133 He forfeited millions in assets and was ordered to perform 
200 hours of community service.134 The owner of Richard’s Pharma, Mr. 
Richard Taylor, was sentenced to 18 months in prison.135 None of the 
prosecutions, however, included charges for injury or harm to patients that 
were relying on receiving genuine, life-saving medicine.136 The lost 
opportunity for sick people to receive treatment in a critical moment could 
literally be a death sentence for them, but with no repercussions to those 
who failed to supply the necessary treatment. 
While sick patients may miss opportunities for recovery when given 
ineffective drugs, counterfeit Avastin has also been found to contain harmful 
bacteria.137 Over 100 people were given contaminated counterfeits in China 
in 2010 in ocular treatments.138 Over half of the patients suffered from serious 
eye inflammation after receiving the dangerous counterfeit during off-label 
use.139 Fortunately, the ophthalmology patients recovered with appropriate 
 
health ministry. The counterfeit drugs passed from Eygpt, to Switzerland, to Denmark, 
and the U.K. prior to discovery in the U.S. Contacts at Sawa claimed the Egyptian 
company obtained the drugs from Turkey. Swiss law required pharmaceutical wholesalers 
to “ensure the pharmaceutical quality” of the products. See Faucon, supra note 76. 
 133.  See Mackey, supra note 97, at 308, tbl. 1. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  See id. 
 137.  S. Imber, Fake Cancer Drug Ring Exposed in Chinese Trial, PARTNERSHIP FOR 
SAFE MEDS. (May 20, 2011), http://www.safemedicines.org/2011/05/fake-cancer-drug-
ring-exposed-in-chinese-trial-253.html. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  S. Imber, Thirteen Indicted of Infiltrating Hospital with Fake Drugs, PARTNERSHIP 
FOR SAFE MEDS. (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.safemedicines.org/2011/04/thirteen-indicted-of-
infiltrating-hospitals-with-fake-drugs-225.html. 
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treatment.140 Increasing sentencing guidelines and penalties not only provides 
deterrence, but also is more fair in relation to the severity and potential to 
profit off the crime. 
CanadaDrugs, which sold the Avastin counterfeits, continues to operate 
today.141 The website continues to market to U.S. consumers and purports to 
receive medication from reputable sources.142 Indictments against CanadaDrugs, 
its subsidiaries, and its employees also continue.143 Allegations of bribery, 
smuggling, and the cover-up endure against the company and the entities 
that certified it to bring a “veneer of legitimacy.”144 
VI.  INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAIN CONCERNS 
The Avastin case exposed loopholes in a previously robust supply chain. 
The drive for cheaper prices and increasing number of links in the supply 
chain weakened quality protections. Each nation in the supply chain had 
standards for pharmaceutical import and export. An examination of those 
standards and the agencies charged with enforcement will show the landscape 
in which counterfeits can be introduced to each market. 
A.  United States 
In 2013, the U.S. accounted for 41% of the global pharmaceutical market.145 
The U.S. is also a global leader in pharmaceutical research and development, 
spending approximately $40 billion annually.146 The U.S. has typically 
 
 140.  See Xiaodong Sun, M.D., Xun Xu, M.D., & Xi Zhang, M.D., Counterfeit 
Bevacizumab and Endophthalmitis, NEW ENG. J. MED. 378, 378–79 (2011), http://www. 
nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc1106415. 
 141.  See CANADADRUGS, https://www.canadadrugs.com/. 
 142.  See id. 
 143.  See U.S. v. CanadaDrugs.com, No. CR14-27-BU-DLC, (Mont., July 17, 2015) 
(United States Courts Archive); see also Matt Voltz, U.S. Charges Canadian Company with 
Smuggling, Money Laundering, FLATHEAD BEACON (Aug. 10, 2015), flatheadbeacon.com/ 
2015/08/10/u-s-charges-canadian-company-with-smuggling-money-laundering/. 
 144.  John Horton, CanadaDrugs.com Indictment Exposes Fake Drug Sales, Pharmacy 
Checker Role, LEGIT SCRIPT (Aug. 18, 2015), https://blog.legitscript.com/2015/08/canada 
drugs-com-indictment-exposes-fake-drug-sales-pharmacychecker-role/. 
 145.  EFPIA, supra note 46, at 5. 
 146.  Id. 
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experienced low rates of pharmaceutical counterfeits in the marketplace.147 It 
is also a leader in introducing biologicals.148 
The FDA has the regulatory authority to approve drugs.149 In the U.S., 
pharmaceuticals are labeled following stringent guidelines from the FDA.150 
When the FDA reviews an application for a new drug, it considers what 
information should appear on the drug’s label.151 The labeling must only 
include uses supported by substantial evidence of safety and effectiveness.152  
Drug labels must provide all medically relevant information for appropriate 
use of the product including dosage, directions for administration, precautions, 
warnings, and contradictions.153 
Furthermore, the U.S. has extensive and detailed regulations regarding 
Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals.154 
GMP regulations are the minimum requirements for drug manufacturing, 
processing, and packaging that ensure drug products are safe, with the 
ingredients and dosage strength that the labeling claims.155 Drugs not 
manufactured under GMP standards are presumed adulterated under the 
FDCA.156 This is due to the risk to public health from impure drugs, which 
is greater than the financial hardship and inconvenience suffered by a 
manufacturer who produces medication without the appropriate controls.157 
The Office of Criminal Investigations (OCI), a division of the FDA, is 
responsible for investigating criminal violations of FDA-regulated products.158 
 
 147.  IMPACT, supra note 2, at 1. 
 148.  Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 2013 Biopharmaceutical 
Research Industry Profile, PHARMA 20 (July 2013), http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/ 
files/pdf/PhRMA%20Profile%202013.pdf. 
 149.  See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. [FDA], Development & Approval Process (Drugs) 
(last accessed Nov. 25, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/; 
see also NIELSON, supra note 157, at 27. 
 150.  See FDA, Labeling (last updated Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ 
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm065010.htm. 
 151.  See Jeffery N. Gibbs, Food & Drug Administration Regulation & Products Liability: 
Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 194, 211 (1987). 
 152.  See id. 
 153.  See 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(d)(1) (2016). 
 154.  21 C.F.R. § 211.1 et seq. (2016). 
 155.  See FDA, Drug Applications and Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) 
Regulations, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/Manufacturing/ucm0 
90016.htm. 
 156.  See FDA, Facts About the Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMPs), http:// 
www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/Manufacturing/ucm169105.htm. 
 157.  See JAMES ROBERT NIELSON, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL DRUG LAW 15 (1992). 
 158.  See FDA, Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations, 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm123027.htm (“All reports of counterfeiting, 
tampering or tampering threats must be immediately reported to the Office of Criminal 
Investigations (OCI) Headquarters’ Office, SAIC-IOD (Special Agent in Charge- Investigative 
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The FDA also works with Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) to enforce 
importation violations.159 Even if a counterfeit drug is detained, its sponsor 
can apply to have the drug returned within 90 days, which often leads to 
counterfeiters repackaging and reshipping the drugs back to the United 
States.160 
B.  Canada 
Health and Welfare Canada is the federal Canadian department responsible 
for “promoting and preserving the health, safety and well-being of all 
Canadians.”161 The Health Protection Branch (HPB) of Health and Welfare 
Canada oversees the “availability, use, manufacture and sale” of 
pharmaceuticals.162 The HPB evaluates new drug submissions, analyzes 
health hazards, and inspects manufacturing plants.163 The HPB is authorized 
to bring criminal charges for non-compliance with Canadian laws and 
regulations.164 
Canada pharmaceutical policy favors affordability.165 Pharmaceutical 
sales in Canada are 2.5% of the global market.166 Drug prices in Canada are 
lower than the U.S. due to drug reference pricing implemented by Canada’s 
Patent Act.167 The Patent Act established the Patented Medicine Prices 
Review Board (PMPRB) in response to high drug prices in Canada.168 The 
 
Operations Division) (301-276-9500) and the Office of Crisis Management (OCM)/Office 
of Emergency Operations (OEO), HFA-615, (301-796-8240).”). 
 159.  COUNTERFEIT PHARMACEUTICAL INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP, REPORT TO THE 
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO CONGRESS 2 (2011), https://www.whitehouse/ 
gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/Pharma_Report_Final.pdf. 
 160.  PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURING, FDA Finalized Authority to Destroy Rejected 
Drug Imports (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.pharmamanufacturing.com/industrynews/2015/ 
fda-finalizes-authority-destroy-rejected-drug-imports/. 
 161.  EILEEN MCMAHON, NEW DRUG APPROVAL IN CANADA 80 (1995). 
 162.  HEALTH PROTECTION BRANCH [HPB], HEALTH PROTECTION & DRUG LAWS 9 
(1991). 
 163.  Id. at 11–12. 
 164.  Patricia I. Carter, Federal Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in the United States 
and Canada, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 215, 224 (1999). 
 165.  Aslam H. Anis, Pharmaceutical policies in Canada: Another Example of Federal– 
Provincial Discord, 162 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 523, 525 (2000), http://www.cmaj. 
ca/content/162/4/523.full.pdf. 
 166.  INVEST IN CANADA, Biopharmaceuticals 2 (2014), http://www.international.gc. 
ca/investors-investisseurs/assets/pdfs/download/canada-biopharmaceuticals-2014.pdf. 
 167.  Patented Medicines Regulations (Patent Act), S.O.R. 94-688 (Can.). 
 168.  See generally Carter, supra note 164, at 245. See An Act to Amend the Patent 
Act., 1987 S.C. c. 41. 
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PMPRB is an independent, quasi-judicial body with the authority to 
investigate and regulate excessive pharmaceutical pricing.169 Determination 
of excessive prices is based on a comparison between Canadian prices and 
the prices in other markets, the prices of similar medications in Canada, 
and changes in Canada’s Consumer Price Index.170 Lower prices in Canada 
attract customers from America where there are no drug price controls.171 
All pharmaceuticals imported into Canada must meet the standards and 
regulations of the Food and Drug Act.172 Canadian labeling guidelines 
require a drug’s label to contain only the name of the drug, adequate direction 
for use, a quantitative list of active ingredients, expiration date, potency, 
and method of administration.173 Canada also adopts GMP requirements 
for pharmaceutical manufacturing.174 
While the GMP requirements of the U.S. and Canada are similar, Canada 
has not adopted the policy of presuming pharmaceuticals are adulterated 
if Canadian GMP standards are not met.175 Canadian law explicitly prohibits 
selling misleading or deceptive drugs.176 The HPB issues Drug Identification 
Number (DIN) to pharmaceuticals.177 The DIN system provides information 
regarding the drug’s manufacture, use, effects, and ingredients.178 
C.  European Union 
Counterfeit drugs accounted for nearly a quarter of all counterfeit goods 
seized in the European Union in 2011.179 The E.U. does not have a harmonized 
system for setting pharmaceutical quality and safety standards.180 Member 
nations are currently responsible for setting their own standards.181 The 
 
 169.  See Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-49. 
 170.  R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4 § 85(1) (Can.). 
 171.  Lana Kraus, Note: Medication Misadventures: The Interaction of International 
Reference Pricing and Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 527, 538 (2004). 
 172.  See Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27 (Can.). 
 173.  MCMAHON, supra note 161, at 80. 
 174.  See Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1997, c. F-27, §§ 21.2-21.3 (Can.). 
 175.  Carter, supra note 164, at 240. 
 176.  Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27, § 9(1) (Can.). 
 177.  See Food and Drug Regulations, C.R.C., c. 870, § C.01.014.1(1) (Can.). See 
generally HPB, supra note 162, at 27. 
 178.  See Food and Drug Regulations, C.R.C., c. 870, §§ C.01.014.1(2)-(3) (Can.). 
 179.  John Lechleiter, Exposing and Eradicating the Dark World of Fake Pharmaceuticals, 
FORBES (Aug. 22, 2012, 12:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlechleiter/2012/08/22/ 
exposing-and-eradicating-the-dark-world-of-fake-pharmaceuticals/. 
 180.  See Norms, Standards, and Guidance for Pharmaceuticals, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
[WHO], http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/quality_safety/quality_assurance/norms_ 
standards/en/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2016). 
 181.  See Comm’n Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 1252/2014 of 28 May 2014 
supplementing Directive 2001/83, of the European Parliament and of the Council with 
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E.U. has, however, addressed counterfeiting in the Falsified Medicines 
Directive.182 As part of the international supply chain, members of the E.U. 
have obligations to take necessary measures to prevent pharmaceuticals 
introduced into the E.U., but not intended for commercialization in the 
E.U., from entering circulation if there are sufficient grounds to suspect 
falsification.183 However, there are no concrete, established guidelines for 
members to follow when assessing the potential falsified character of those 
products.184 Despite being a transient stop on the counterfeit Avastin’s 
importation route, this obligation did not stop the fake biologic from passing 
through E.U.’s borders. 
The E.U. has adopted legislative proposals for pharmaceutical quality.185 
In particular, the aim is to address the risk of falsified medicines entering 
the legal supply chain.186 The proposals introduce unique identifiers to 
facilitate the verification of pharmaceutical authenticity.187 Regulations for 
verifying drug identity were promulgated in 2016 detailing safety features 
such as scannable barcodes and information harmonization among nations.188 
The current lack of standardization across the E.U. is a regulatory point 
of weakness where counterfeits originating outside of the E.U. may entrench 
themselves in the supply chain due to confusion of requirements. The 
perception of the E.U. having a strong quality system leads to greater trust 
in parallel imports, even where heightened risks exist. 
 
regard to principles and guidelines of good manufacturing practice for active substances 
for medicinal products for human use, 2014 O.J. (L 337) 1 (EU). 
 182.  See Directive 2011/62, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2011 amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal 
products for human Use, as regards the prevention of the entry into the legal supply chain 
of falsified medicinal products, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 74 (EU). 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  See Falsified Medicines, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/health/human- 
use/falsified_medicines/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2016) [hereinafter  Falsified 
Medicines]. 
 185.  See Directive 2001/83, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, 
2001 O.J. (L 311) 67 (EC). 
 186.  See Falsified Medicines, supra note 184. 
 187.  See Directive 2011/62, supra note 182. 
 188.  Commission Regulation 2016/161, 2016 O.J. (L 32) 1 (EU). 
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D.  Turkey 
The Turkish Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Institution (Institution) 
regulates pharmaceuticals.189 The Institution is responsible for imports, 
exports, licensing, manufacturing, and general control of pharmaceuticals.190 
In Turkey, the Pharmaceutical and Medical Preparation Law govern 
medications.191 There are also three industry-based associations establishing 
guidelines in Turkey and each has their own code of practices.192 The 
Turkish regulatory framework includes granting marketing authorizations,193 
labeling specifications,194 and monitoring requirements.195 
The Turkish Pharmacists’ Association regulates Turkish pharmaceutical 
imports.196 The Association only allows products registered in their system 
to be imported.197 The system includes information regarding the product 
names that may be imported, including the source of the product.198 
There is no specific law or regulation targeting counterfeiting and illegal 
distribution of medications in Turkey.199 A counterfeiter causing “risk to 
another’s life and health” is punishable with one to five years of imprisonment 
and a punitive fine.200 The punishment increases if a person acting within 
the scope of their profession commits the offense.201 Misuse of a trademark 
 
 189.  Özge Atilgan Karakulak et al., Turkey, in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH, LIFE 
SCIENCES 2016 1 (Alexander Ehlers ed. 2016); Decree Law No. 663, 2011 (Turk.). 
 190.  Karakulak, supra note 189. 
 191.   Id.; Decree Law No. 1262, 1928 (Turk.); see also Baris Kalayci, Hande Hançer 
& Pinar Arikan, Turkey: Selection, Clearance, and Registration, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2016), http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/Intelligence/Pharmaceutical-
Trademarks/2015/Country-chapters/Turkey. 
 192.  Karakulak, supra note 189, at 119 (the Turkey Pharmaceutical Industry Association 
(TISD), the Association of Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies (AIFD), and the 
Pharmaceuticals Manufacturers Association (IEIS)). 
 193.  See Licensing of Medicinal Products for Human Use (Licensing Regulation) 
(Official Gazette No. 25705 of 19 Jan. 2005) (Turk.); Özge Atılgan Karakulak & Tuğçe 
Avcısert Geçgil, Distribution and Marketing of Drugs in Turkey: Overview, PRACTICAL 
LAW (Sept. 1, 2015), http://us.practicallaw.com/2-618-7255 [hereinafter Distribution and 
Marketing of Drugs in Turkey]. 
 194.  Regulation on Labeling and Packaging of Medicinal Products for Human Use 
(Labeling Regulation) (Official Gazette No. 25904 of 12 August 2005) (Turk.); Distribution 
and Marketing of Drugs in Turkey, supra note 193. 
 195.  Regulation on Safety Monitoring of Medicinal Products for Human Use (Safety 
Regulation) (Official Gazette No. 28973 of 15 April 2014) (Turk.); Distribution and Marketing 
of Drugs in Turkey, supra note 193. 
 196.  Karakulak, supra note 189, at 122. 
 197.  Distribution and Marketing of Drugs in Turkey, supra note 193. 
 198.  Karakulak, supra note 189, at 122 (explaining the Pharmaceutical Importation 
Programme). 
 199.  Id. at 123. 
 200.  Id.; Turk. Crim. C. art. 186. 
 201.  Karakulak, supra note 189, at 12; Turk. Crim. C. art. 186. 
ABMA (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2017  2:19 PM 
[VOL. 18:  161, 2016]  Bitter Biopharmaceuticals 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 183 
is also punishable.202 If counterfeit medicines are imported into Turkey 
without being subject to customs procedures, the products will be subject 
to smuggling penalties as well.203 
License and marketing authorization is continuously under the scrutiny 
of a qualified physician responsible for pharmacovigilance.204 The Turkish 
Pharmacovigilance Centre (TUFAM) is the competent authority to follow 
the pharmacovigilance reports and constantly updates the database.205 
Pharmaceuticals cannot be marketed in Turkey unless properly licensed.206 
VII.  PUBLIC POLICY AND RESPONSE 
“We’re seeing a lot of places that are reporting to the wrong agencies . . .” 
said Gaurvika Nayyar, a programme manager with the US Pharmacopeial 
Convention, a nonprofit which sets standards for drug quality.207 Numerous 
governmental agencies and working groups tasked with tracking and 
enforcing counterfeit laws have sprung up in response to the growing 
counterfeit problem.208 Policy response has leveraged focus on public 
education.209 International coordination by public and private sources also 
 
 202.  Decree Law No. 556. Art. 61 (Turk.). 
 203.  See Law to Counter Smuggling No. 5607 (Turk.). 
 204.  Karakulak, supra note 189, at 13. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. (marketing authorization granted by the Ministry of Health pursuant to the 
Licensing Regulation). 
 207.  Perks, supra note 10; see also U.S. Pharmacopeial Convention, http://www.usp.org/ 
about-usp (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). 
 208.  Many collaborative private and government groups have formed to educate the 
public and monitor counterfeit pharmaceutical activity. For example, the Permanent 
Forum on International Pharmaceutical Crime (PFIPC) is an international enforcement 
forum aimed at protecting public health and safety through the exchange of information and 
ideas to foster mutual cooperation. PERMANENT FORUM ON INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL 
CRIME (last visited Feb. 7, 2016), http://www.pfipc.org/.  The members of PFIPC are 
dedicated professionals from 15 countries whose goal is to enhance the protection of public 
health by combatting pharmaceutical crime. See PERMANENT FORUM ON INTERNATIONAL 
PHARMACEUTICAL CRIME (last visited Feb. 7, 2016), http://www.pfipc.org/who-we-are. 
The Heads of Medicines Agencies—Working Group of Enforcement Officers (HMA-
WGEO) was established to contribute to the protection of public health and welfare, 
including animal health, through ensuring adherence to the regulations of manufacturing 
and distribution chains of medicinal products, disruption of illegal activities and the 
sharing of information. HEADS OF MEDICINES AGENCIES (last visited Feb. 7, 2016), http:// 
www.hma.eu/wgeo.html. 
 209.  COUNTERFEIT PHARMACEUTICAL INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP, supra note 
159, at 10–13. 
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seeks to harmonize import and export policies introducing new advancements 
in technology to secure the supply chain. 
A.  World Health Organization 
The WHO is a United Nations agency fostering international cooperation 
in the health field.210 The WHO develops and promotes international standards, 
nomenclature, and guidelines concerning biological and pharmaceutical 
substances.211 The WHO adopts conventions on worldwide health matters.212 
Conventions are binding treaties.213 Regulations adopted by the WHO’s 
Health Assembly come into force for all members unless duly rejected.214 
Regulations are binding obligations, unlike resolutions and recommendations, 
which are not legally binding.215 
The WHO Certification Scheme for the Quality of Pharmaceutical Products 
(Certification Scheme) recommends uniform guidelines for the international 
supply chain.216 The WHO adopted these guiding principles for national 
regulatory authorities to assure not only the quality, but also the safety and 
efficacy, of pharmaceutical products in international commerce.217 The 
Certification Scheme is a voluntary administrative agreement facilitating 
international pharmaceutical trade.218 
The principles, adopted in 1986, emphasize the need for a formal agreement 
between participating Member States to provide information on pharmaceutical 
exports.219 It requires registration status in the country of origin and 
information concerning manufacturer compliance with the WHO’s GMP 
guidelines.220 To maximize effectiveness, the Certification Scheme ensures 
that imported products are in conformity with relevant import license 
 
 210.  KELLEY LEE, THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO) 1 (Thomas G. Weiss 
ed., 2009). 
 211.  Id. at 18. 
 212.  WHO CONST. art. 19 (1946). 
 213.  LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 110 (2014). 
 214.  WHO CONST. art. 21; id. art. 22 (1946). 
 215.  GIAN LUCA BURCI & CLAUDE-HENRI VIGNES, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
56 (2004). 
 216.  WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GUIDELINES ON IMPORT PROCEDURES ON 
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS, WHO TECHNICAL SUPPORT SERIES NO. 863, 185 (1996), 
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/quality_safety/quality_assurance/GuidelinesImportP
roceduresPharmaceuticalProductsTRS863Annex12.pdf. 
 217.  Id. at 185. 
 218.  WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], WHO Certification Scheme on the Quality 
of Pharmaceutical Products Moving in International Commerce: Questions and Answers 
(May 2010), http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/quality_safety/regulation_legislation/ 
certification/qas_certif_scheme_2011.pdf. 
 219.  WHO, supra note 216, at 185. 
 220.  Id. 
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regulations.221 The Certification Scheme secures the supply chain by 
regulating storage and transit facilities with controls at every stage of 
transportation.222 
The Certification Scheme advises that importation of pharmaceuticals 
be implemented by national drug regulatory authorities (DRA).223 Accordingly, 
importation of pharmaceutical products would be channeled exclusively 
through a national customs post specifically designed for drug imports.224 
Only products appropriately licensed for marketing within the importing 
country would be cleared through the specialized customs post.225 To 
facilitate legitimate importation, the customs post would have centrally 
compiled information concerning authorized import agents, issue notifications, 
and similar alerts for specialized screening of pharmaceutical imports.226 
Implementation of controls is further outlined in the Certification Scheme.227 
Varying levels of sophistication between nations means that there is 
variance in the implementation of the Quality Scheme.228 Improvements 
to the Quality Scheme are monitored, evaluated, and updated as the global 
pharmaceutical industry responds to supply chain conditions.229 The WHO 
has also adopted notification requirements to the Division of Drug 
Management and Policies.230 
B.  Private Action by the Pharmaceutical Industry 
The pharmaceutical industry is on the front lines of the fight against 
counterfeits. Private drug companies drive many counterfeiter convictions.231 
Due to the great investments made in research and development and the 
additional cost of regulatory compliance, drug companies have a compelling 
 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id. at 186. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  See id. 
 228.  See generally Anna Sahl, Relevance of a Certificate of Pharmaceutical Product 
for Registration and Life Cycle Management of Imported Drugs (2013) (unpublished 
Masters thesis, Bonn University), http://dgra.de/media/pdf/studium/masterthesis/master_ 
sahl_a.pdf. 
 229.  See generally id. 
 230.  WHO, supra note 216, at 189. 
 231.  Barbara Moran, Cracking Down on Counterfeit Drugs, NOVA NEXT (Aug. 20, 
2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/body/uncovering-counterfeit-medicines/. 
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interest in protecting the public from detrimental effects of fake 
pharmaceuticals. 
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) 
is a trade organization of biopharmaceutical researchers and biotechnology 
companies.232 PhRMA members work to improve pharmacologic vigilance 
by forming policies that may eventually be adopted by law. In 2003, PhRMA 
members adopted a voluntary notification system agreeing to notify the 
OCI of counterfeit discoveries within five days.233 U.S. law now requires 
notification.234 
Track and trace systems play a major role in the legitimate supply chain. 
Manufacturers use technology to control and monitor the supply chain. 
Radio-frequency identification (RFID) is used by manufacturers to track 
and trace products moving through the supply chain.235 In another 
technological advancement, research teams are developing 3D barcodes 
to authenticate products.236 Barcodes are beneficial because they are 
scannable by anyone with a smartphone.237 The benefits of tracking and 
tracing technology to both patients and manufacturers are decreases in the 
cost due to security and efficiency. 
The pharmaceutical industry is developing other means of verifying 
drug identity. For example, scientists are using spectroscopy to authenticate 
the chemical fingerprint of biologics.238 Spectroscopy is wavelength 
measurement of light refraction.239 The technique is nonintrusive, making 
direct analysis possible through packaging such as a glass vial.240 Another 
advantage is that inspectors can perform analysis using hand held scanners.241 
Direct analysis of biopharmaceuticals is an advantage when counterfeiters 
dilute genuine drugs or mix counterfeits into a shipment of legitimate 
medicines. 
The pharmaceutical industry uses traditional supply chain techniques along 
with more sophisticated methods to ensure the supply of safe pharmaceuticals 
 
 232.  PHRMA, About PhRMA (last visited Feb. 7, 2016), http://www.phrma.org/about. 
 233.  Nelson, supra note 17, at 1082. 
 234.  Drug Supply Chain Security Act (DSCSA), § 582(b)(4)(B) (2012). 
 235.  See Product Counterfeiting: How Fakes are Undermining U.S. Jobs, Innovation, 
and Consumer Safety: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer 
Prot, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of James Christian). 
 236.  Tiger Webb, 3D Barcodes May Stop Counterfeits, THE SCIENCE SHOW (Oct. 13, 
2015), http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/scienceshow/3d-barcodes-counterfeit-
goods/6850820. 
 237.  Perks, supra note 10. 
 238.  Kalyanaraman, supra note 57, at 60. 
 239.  What is Spectroscopy?, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA (last visited Feb. 7, 2016), 
http://loke.as.arizona.edu/~ckulesa/camp/spectroscopy_intro.html. 
 240.  Kalyanaraman, supra note 57, at 60. 
 241.  See id. at 60–61. 
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to patients. Innovation in tracking and identifying medication allows the 
industry to stay a step ahead of counterfeiters seeking to profit from the 
industry’s development efforts.242 Manufacturers of biologics take on these 
efforts to protect their goodwill and ensure patients can trust the medications 
they are taking.243 
VIII.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
“A major objective is for countries to agree that counterfeiting is a crime 
against human security and incorporate that principle into their laws,” said 
Dr. Howard Zucker, WHO Assistant Director-General for Health Technology 
and Pharmaceuticals.244 Identifying weaknesses in monitoring and tracking 
shipments through international commerce is also increasingly important 
in the global marketplace. After the Avastin counterfeit case, the world 
moved to improve drug monitoring and secure the supply chain responding 
to the growing counterfeit trade. Penalties for medicinal counterfeiting in 
Europe and the U.S. have addressed this need and are included in recent 
legislative developments. 
In 2013, the Drug Supply Chain Security Act (DSCSA) was signed into 
law in the U.S.245 The new federal legislation preempts all state law, regulations, 
and requirements for tracing pharmaceuticals through the supply chain, 
creating a unified American system.246 The DSCSA requires the FDA to 
implement a national track-and-trace system in which manufacturers must 
attach product identifiers, such as bar codes, to each package or case of 
pharmaceutical product intended for the supply chain.247 
Under the DSCSA, participants in the pharmaceutical supply chain, 
including distributors, dispensers, and repackagers, must develop 
 
 242.  See Moran, supra note 231. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  World Health Org., WHO and partners accelerate fight against counterfeit medicines 
WHO.INT (Nov. 15, 2006), http://who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2006/pr69/en/. 
 245.  Drug Quality and Security Act, Pub. L. No. 113–54, 127 Stat. 587 (2013) (to be 
codified in 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.); Bikash Chatterjee, Serialization and the Drug Quality 
& Security Act, PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURING (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www. 
pharmamanufacturing.com/articles/2015/serialization-drug-quality-security-act/. 
 246.  Bikash Chatterjee, Serialization and the Drug Quality & Security Act, 
PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURING (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.pharmamanufacturing. 
com/articles/2015/serialization-drug-quality-security-act/. 
 247.  McGuireWoods, Legal Alert: Drug Quality and Security Act (Dec. 4, 2013), 
https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2013/12/Drug-Quality-and-
Security-Act.aspx. 
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authentication methods to determine the legitimacy of pharmaceutical 
products under their control.248 The new law requires prompt FDA notification 
of illegitimate products.249 Upon determining a counterfeit product is 
present, participants in the secure drug supply chain must notify not only 
the FDA, but trading partners as well, preventing further circulation of 
compromised medication.250 The DSCSA also requires FDA notification 
if counterfeiting is suspected, but not verified.251 Violations of the DSCSA 
are criminal in nature.252 Counterfeit traffickers face up to 10 years in prison 
and up to $2 million dollars in fines.253 
The DSCSA is implemented in phases over the next decade.254 The first 
steps are improving traceability and documentation of pharmaceutical lots 
in the supply chain.255 The legislation emphasizes the “pedigree” model 
of tracing pharmaceuticals.256 Products are serialized, aggregated, and 
authenticated at each change in custody.257 This information is shared by 
trading partners in the supply chain.258 The weakness to this model is that 
counterfeits could enter the supply chain at any point from multiple 
distribution centers.259 In the final phases, the supply chain system will be 
able to track a specific pharmaceutical product all the way back to the 
manufacturer, thus addressing this problem.260 
Europe is taking similar measures to secure the pharmaceutical supply 
chain. The E.U. strengthened the European supply chain in 2013 with 
 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 582(b)(4)(B) (2015). 
 250.  See Are You Ready for the Drug Supply Chain Security Act?, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION [FDA],  http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/DrugIntegrityandSupplyChain 
Security/DrugSupplyChainSecurityAct/ucm427033.htm (last updated Mar. 1, 2016). 
 251.  See Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-7 (2016). 




 253.  Id. 
 254.  Brian Daleiden, Protecting Patient Safety and the Drug Supply Chain Security 
Act (DSCSA), BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.beckershospitalreview. 
com/quality/protecting-patient-safety-and-the-drug-supply-chain-security-act-dscsa.html. 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  Heather Zenk, Understanding the Drug Supply Chain Security Act and How it Impacts 
Your Pharmacy,  AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR AUTOMATION IN PHARMACY 5 (June 25–27, 2015),  
http://www.asapnet.org/files/June2015/Presentations/ASAPJune15_Presentation_09_Zen
k.pdf. 
 257.  Chatterjee, supra note 246. 
 258.  Id. 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  ENVIRONMENTAL XPRT, Policy Management – DCSCA – Drug Supply Chain Integrity 
(July 22, 2015), http://www.environmental-expert.com/articles/policy-management-dcsca- 
drug-supply-chain-integrity-571661. 
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amendments to the Falsified Medicines Directive.261 Additional notification 
and documentation measures are required of supply chain participants.262 
Wholesalers are required to notify authorities if falsified product is suspected263 
and to record pharmaceutical batch information.264 Member nations are 
required to report incidents to an E.U. database and remove suspected 
counterfeits from the supply chain.265 The directive obliges member nations 
to each set criminal penalties that are effective and dissuasive.266 
According to the Council of Europe (COE), “[I]ncidences of counterfeit 
medical products and similar crimes undermine public trust in healthcare 
systems and authorities’ surveillance . . .”267 To this end, the COE Convention 
on the Counterfeiting of Medical Products and Similar Crimes involving 
threats to Public Health (Medicrime Convention) took effect in January 
2016.268 The COE is a pan-European political organization including 47 
member states.269 At least 24 member nations have signed or ratified the 
Medicrime Convention signaling a willingness for criminal enforcement 
 
 261.  Council Directive 2011/62/EU of 8 June 2011, amending Directive 2001/83/EC 
on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, as regards the 
Prevention of the Entry into the Legal Supply Chain of Falsified Medicinal Products, 2011 
O.J. (L174) 74 (EC). 
 262.  Sonja Seeberger, The New Falsified Medicine Directive 2011/62/EU and Its 
Requirements for Stakeholders (2012) (unpublished Master’s dissertation, University of 
Bonn) (available online at http://dgra.de/media/pdf/studi um/masterthesis/master_seebe 
rger_s.pdf. 
 263.  Council Directive 2011/62/EU of 8 June 2011, amending Directive 2001/83/EC 
on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, as regards the 
Prevention of the Entry into the Legal Supply Chain of Falsified Medicinal Products, art. 
80(i), 2011 O.J. (L174) 74 (EC). 
 264.  Council Directive 2011/62/EU of 8 June 2011, amending Directive 2001/83/EC 
on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, as regards the 
Prevention of the Entry into the Legal Supply Chain of Falsified Medicinal Products, art. 
80(e), 2011 O.J. (L174) 74 (EC). 
 265.  Seeberger, supra note 262, at 42. 
 266.  Council Directive 2011/62/EU of 8 June 2011, amending Directive 2001/83/EC 
on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, as regards the 
Prevention of the Entry into the Legal Supply Chain of Falsified Medicinal Products, art. 
118(a), 2011 O.J. (L174) 74 (EC); see also Seeberger, supra note 262, at 43–44. 
 267.  Catherine Saez, Medicrime Convention Against Counterfeit Drugs To Enter Into 
Force In 2016, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/ 
2015/10/01/medicrime-convention-against-counterfeit-drugs-to-enter-into-force-in-2016/. 
 268.  COUNCIL OF EUROPE [COE], Press Release – DC123(2015) (Sept. 24, 2015), 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2362047&Site=DC&BackColorInternet=F5CA75&
BackColorIntranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9BACE. 
 269.  COUNCIL OF EUROPE [COE], Maps & Members, http://www.coe.int/en/web/ 
tbilisi/the-coe/objectives-and-missions (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). 
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of counterfeiting crimes.270 The Medicrime Convention is a binding 
international instrument.271 
The broad scope of the Medicrime Convention leaves individual nations 
to fill legislative gaps.272 For example, the treaty states, “Each Party shall take 
the necessary legislative and other measures to establish as offences under 
its domestic law,” which leaves room for varying interpretations.273 The 
Medicrime Convention sets out a framework for international and interagency 
cooperation, encouraging the sharing of data with both government and 
private agencies,274 and establishing counterfeiting offenses and addressing 
documentation issues.275 The COE measures aim to ensure compatibility 
between E.U. and non-E.U. nations while providing the flexibility needed 
to implement such system.276 
Pharmaceutical tracking systems in Europe follows an “authentication” 
model.277 This model uses item-level serialization, database registration, 
and authentication at the point of dispensation.278 Both the pedigree and 
authentication model require further covert means of anti-counterfeiting 
technology to be fully effective.279 
Global efforts to manage the supply chain are reactions to the ingenuity 
of counterfeiters threatening a previously robust system that is increasingly 
interconnected. Legislation is frequently implemented in phases that 
may take decades to fully take effect.280 For example, the Drug Supply 
Chain Security Act will be phased in over a period of 10 years.281 The 
comprehensive statute requires guidance to be established for information 
exchange, product identification, package tracking, and evaluation of the 
 
 270.  COE, supra note 268. 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  Susanne Keitel, MD, The MEDICRIME Convention: criminalising the falsification 
of medicines and similar crimes, GENERICS AND BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE J. 138, 139 (2012), 
http://gabi-journal.net/the-medicrime-convention-criminalising-the-falsification-of-medicines- 
and-similar-crimes.html. 
 273.  Council of Europe: Convention on the counterfeiting of medical products and 
similar crimes involving threats to public health [hereinafter MEDICRIME Convention] 
COE 211, art. 6 (Oct. 28, 2011). 
 274.  MEDICRIME Convention, art. 1, 17. 
 275.  COUNCIL OF EUROPE [COE], The MEDICRIME Convention (last visited Feb. 7, 2016), 
https://www.edqm.eu/en/the-medicrime-convention-1470.html. 
 276.  COUNCIL OF EUROPE [COE], FAQ eTACT – What You Should Know About eTACT 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2016), https://www.edqm.eu/en/FAQ-eTACT-1482.html. 
 277.  Chatterjee, supra note 246. 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  Id. 
 280.  See id. 
 281.  FDA, supra note 250. 
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system with targeted goals for different stakeholders implemented in stages.282 
Vigilance and deterrence are required to maximize pharmaceutical safety 
and protect patients that rely on life-saving treatments. 
IX.  RECOMMENDATION 
“We don’t have the necessary data or surveillance to effectuate meaningful 
public health interventions or policy change,” said Tim Mackey, author 
and professor at the University of California, San Diego.283 Standardization and 
communication are essential to a secure international pharmaceutical supply 
chain. A global central authority is needed to coordinate international 
counterfeiting information. While different regional strategies will be used to 
suit legislative and enforcement needs of individual nations, a unifying 
program bringing data from various track and trace programs is needed to 
detect the international movement of counterfeits. 
There must also be an incentive for those in possession of potential 
counterfeits to investigate the products without financial detriment. Red 
flags, such as purchasing at deep discounts and suspect packaging, give a 
possessor using reasonable care constructive knowledge of a counterfeit. 
However, without harsher penalties for counterfeit suppliers, there is little 
deterrent effect by any regulatory scheme. There are many broad solutions 
discussed to address the problem.284 The following recommendations set 
up a framework to achieve these objectives. 
First, the WHO should take the lead and coordinate compulsory reporting 
of counterfeiting events to the WHO. There must be a central point of 
worldwide authority entrusted with surveillance of counterfeit medications 
and biologics. A centralized reporting system will remove international 
information gaps where counterfeiters flourish. 
In conjunction with amendments to the Certification Scheme and a 
WHO reporting system program incorporating the various data already 
 
 282.  Id. (presenting DSCSA deliverables timeframes); see also U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION [FDA], CDER Small Business and Industry Assistance (CDER SBIA) 
Webinar on The Drug Supply Chain Security Act, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Development 
ApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/ucm388150.htm (last updated Oct. 5, 2015) 
(explaining drug regulation and key aspects of the DSCSA). 
 283.  Perks, supra note 10. 
 284.  Jessica A. Ritsick, Don’t Call It a Counterfeit, and Other Recommendations 
From the IOM Report on Falsified and Substandard Drugs, FDA LAW BLOG (Feb. 15, 
2013), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2013/02/dont-call-it-
a-counterfeit-and-other-recommendations-from-the-iom-report-on-falsified-and-substandar.html. 
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collected around the world, the WHO would require mandatory notification 
to the WHO of counterfeits identified in the supply chain by WHO nations. 
Non-WHO members would also be encouraged to report counterfeit events 
further supplementing the reporting system. The program would also 
incorporate track and trace data from nations and private sources. Some 
have noted such a database would also include pharmaceutical license 
suspensions.285 
With notification requirements and a transparent reporting system assessable 
to partners, the WHO, in monitoring the reporting system, would have greater 
power to facilitate international cooperation and enforcement. Trend analysis 
and policy recommendations stemming from comprehensive data gathering 
could more precisely identify supply chain paths the counterfeits are taking 
across borders. 
A WHO reporting system would not supersede national drug authorities’ 
mandate to police pharmaceutical trade and establish regulations. Rather 
the WHO must act to bring together information from regional systems 
into a comprehensive package. The WHO in such a program could further 
evaluate the differences between the European model and the DSCSA 
requirements for tracking and pedigree documentation. A central program 
must overcome the difficulties of data analysis in different surveillance 
systems.286 
The dual models of tracking pharmaceutical inventory will not prove to 
be mutually exclusive where counterfeits are concerned. A broad WHO 
reporting system inclusive of currently gathered data would increase 
international communication. Efforts at a web-based system are in progress 
at the WHO.287 A WHO system must incentives both Member States and other 
entities to report collected data. 
As seen in the Avastin case, counterfeits were repeatedly sold through 
the same importation channels. Identification of these channels would 
have led to targeted inspections and prevented subsequent batches of fake 
Avastin from reaching cancer patients. In this case, River East Supplies in 
the U.K. would have been identified by the WHO and inspected by U.K. 
authorities in conjunction coordinated international support. Discrepancies in 
the importation paperwork, misleading sources of the drugs, and notification 
from medical professionals could have been reported to and detected by 
the WHO. The original counterfeit manufacturing sources could have been 
tracked down and the counterfeit inventory spread throughout the supply 
chain quarantined. Once the supply chain was secured, problems with 
importation paperwork and regulatory compliance could be remedied and 
 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  Perks, supra note 10. 
 287.  Mackey, supra note 6, at 65. 
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appropriate measures taken by local regulatory authorities in accordance 
with local guidelines. 
With the WHO on the forefront of coordinated reporting of counterfeiting, 
a globalized surveillance authority could track counterfeit pharmaceuticals. 
With international cooperation, individual nations would have the freedom to 
enforce their laws using information and support gathered from the WHO. 
Mandatory notification of counterfeits identified and the methods of importation 
increase transparency and catch counterfeiters, and their enabling suppliers, 
responsible for tainting the supply chain. 
Second, the WHO should implement a purchase back and testing program 
for suspicious medication. By purchasing questionable pharmaceuticals 
from doctors, distributors, and wholesalers, the WHO can directly test drugs 
for authenticity. Counterfeit medicines around the globe kill over one million 
people annually.288 Managing a testing program facilitates WHO mission 
objectives to strengthen health services and establishing standards for safe 
medicines.289 The effects of a testing program are described below. Such 
a program would be cost effective given the $18 billion in lost profits alone.290 
There are also additional savings worldwide to public health agencies in 
terms of improved patient outcomes. 
Pharmaceutical testing and adulterant screening is a public health harm 
reduction service with proven effectiveness in illicit markets.291 For example, 
in the Netherlands an ecstasy monitoring program monitored the levels of 
MDMA found in the illegal street drug.292 The program found that ecstasy 
tainted with dangerous drugs such as speed exited the market after warning 
campaigns.293 Other research shows that illicit market samples begin 
corresponding to the expected ingredients when pill-testing results are 
 
 288.  Natalie Southwick, Counterfeit Drugs Kill 1 Mn People Annually: Interpol, INSIGHT 
CRIME (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/counterfeit-drugs-kill-1-million-
annually-interpol. 
 289.  Trade, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy and Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www. 
who.int/trade/en/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). 
 290.  Irwin A. Blackstone, Ph.D. et al., The Health and Economic Effects of Counterfeit 
Drugs, AMERICAN HEALTH AND DRUG BENEFITS (June 2014), http://www.ahdbonline.com/ 
issues/2014/june-2014-vol-7-no-4/1756-the-health-and-economic-effects-of-counterfeit-drugs. 
 291.  Alison Ritter, Six Reasons Australia Should Pilot ‘Pill Testing’ Party Drugs, THE 
CONVERSATION (Nov. 11, 2014, 2:31 PM), http://theconversation.com/six-reasons-australia- 
should-pilot-pill-testing-party-drugs-34073. 
 292.  Inge P. Spruit, Monitoring Synthetic Drug Markets, Trends, and Public Health, 
36 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 23, 24 (2001), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1081/ 
JA-100000227. 
 293.  Id. at 37–38. 
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known.294 The WHO buy-back type program would provide options to 
submit single samples for testing and be reimbursed for the sample purchase 
price. Reimbursement is critical due to the high cost of biologics. Health care 
providers must not be discouraged from pursuing dubious pharmaceuticals 
because it is financially burdensome to do so. 
A centralized purchase back program is needed because some counterfeits, 
when recalled by a distributor, are simply resold to another buyer and make 
their way back to patients.295 A guaranteed reimbursement by the WHO 
prevents counterfeits from silently returning to the supply chain. The program 
would give the WHO more control in identifying counterfeit “hot spots.” 
Had a purchase back system been in place in 2012, authorities may have 
noticed much sooner that East River Supplies, Richard’s Services, and 
CanadaDrugs were major sources of counterfeits. In the Avastin case, 
nurses and medical staff questioned the legitimacy of the drugs in their 
possession because the packaging was suspect.296 The ability to submit 
the samples for testing through a purchase back program would have 
provided 1) a definitive answer to the doctor from the WHO about the 
exact nature and condition of the potential counterfeit, and 2) by using a 
purchase back mechanism the doctor would not lose money and be able 
to stay in the business of providing patient care while a qualified agency 
entity validated safety. 
Due to the high cost of biologics, doctors may only purchase limited 
amounts of the drugs for their patients.297 Sick patients need the drugs right 
away, but caregivers cannot take a chance on dubious pharmaceuticals. 
The WHO could exchange legitimate drugs rather than make a payment 
for the tested dose. Such exchanges facilitated in conjunction with national 
regulatory authorities ensure the appropriate local laws are followed. A 
quick exchange through local channels ensures patient care continuity. 
In identifying counterfeits, the WHO would also send notice to the 
appropriate regulatory authorities of the need for auditing and inspection 
of the supply networks importing counterfeits. The results of drug testing 
would be input into the reporting system for further sharing of information 
among agencies and health care providers. 
Third, the DSCSA must be amended to include personal injury liability 
for knowingly compromising the supply chain. When sellers ship biologic 
 
 294.  An Inventory of On-Site Pill-Testing Interventions in the EU, at 55, EMCDDA 
(2001). 
 295.  Horton, supra note 144. 
 296.  See, e.g., Bill Berkot, Doctors scour drug supplies after fake Avastin found, 
REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2012, 7:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-avastin-idUSTRE 
81F03220120216. 
 297.  James C. Robinson, Insurers’ Strategies for Managing the Use and Cost of 
Biopharmaceuticals, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS No. 5 1205, 1206, 1209 (2006). 
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medication outside of specified storage requirements, such as a refrigerated 
temperature, they should be liable for patient harm for knowingly compromising 
and endangering patient safety.298 Supply chain participants using reasonable 
care under the circumstances have constructive knowledge of the counterfeits. 
Furthermore, physicians that knowingly continue to purchase counterfeit 
products and have direct knowledge of adverse patient events should be 
subject to increased penalties for assault and battery of their patients.299 In 
spite of the difficulties in proving that a drug administered to patients was 
counterfeit, actual harm in the case of biologics can be presumed. Doctors 
and distributors that knowingly conceal pharmaceutical shipments by falsifying 
documents to avoid customs confiscation are complicit in illegal distribution. 
They must be held accountable to patients harmed by their actions. 
Patient harm can be presumed because counterfeits compromise a sick 
person’s chance to receive treatment and recover. By not receiving the 
appropriate treatment, a patient is harmed with continued illness. Worse, 
counterfeits may harm patients, but the effects could be perceived as part 
of the preexisting condition. Patients may never know they did not receive 
the right medication and that the side effects are not normal or expected. 
None of the counterfeit Avastin legal claims directly related to personal 
injury associated with patient safety and adverse events.300 Currently, 
importation of unapproved pharmaceuticals in the U.S. is a strict liability 
offense.301 Anyone in a position of responsibility may be prosecuted for 
introducing an adulterated drug into interstate commerce.302 But, there is 
no enforcement beyond the most egregious offenses.303 For example, in 
 
 298.  See Contract Pharma Presents Strategies for Mitigating Risk and Ensuring 
Compliance in the Biomaterial Cold Chain, BIO STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES, http://www. 
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ensuring-compliance-in-the-biomaterial-cold-chain/; see also 21 CFR § 250.50(a)(2) (codifying 
the need to ensure proper refrigeration during transportation when needed). 
 299.  See Press Release, Dept. of Justice, supra note 33; see also Howard Sklamberg, 
Deputy Comm ‘r for Glob. Regulatory Operations & Policy, Food & Drug Admin., Speech 
Before the Committee on Energy and Commerce: Counterfeit Drugs: Fighting Illegal Supply 
Chains (Feb. 27, 2014). 
 300.  Mackey, supra note 97, at 303. 
 301.  Importation of Drugs, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION [FDA], http://www. 
fda.gov/ForIndustry/ImportProgram/ucm173751.htm (last updated Sept. 25, 2015). 
 302.  21 U.S.C. § 331 (2016). 
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ABMA (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2017  2:19 PM 
 
196 
2008 an Arizona couple pled guilty to selling counterfeit drugs made in 
India through an online pharmacy making millions of dollars on over 600 
brand names sold at deep discounts.304 In 2014, three people in Texas were 
charged with smuggling over 100,000 counterfeit pills into the U.S.305 The 
Chinese supplier allegedly paid the defendants involved in the conspiracy.306 
Finally, the WHO Certification Scheme should also be amended to include 
a minimum recommended penalty for lack of due diligence when importing 
drugs through the gray market. Supply chain participants should know that 
when they purchase medications with substantial discounts that the 
medications carry a substantial risk of adulteration. The potential for patient 
harm is inferred from the circumstances surrounding importation from the 
gray market and unlicensed sources. 
Marketing efforts that have a higher risk of counterfeiting fraud, such 
as fax and email blasts sent from ambiguous sources, are a red flag to 
distributors and doctors that they are purchasing fraudulent products and 
counterfeits. New track and trace requirements in the U.S. and E.U. may 
reduce these types marketing techniques. 
The WHO provides guidance on health policy.307 By setting a penalty 
standard for neglecting due diligence the WHO will continue to be a leader 
healthcare policy. Establishing this guidance encourages others to do the 
same. 
These recommendations accomplish the goals necessary to prevent 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals from reaching patients. Through international 
communication, purchase and testing programs, and increased penalties, 
the supply chain becomes more secure. These changes contain both preventive 
and deterrent effects to counterfeiting. 
 
practicemanager-violating-fooddrug (oncology doctors were convicted of purchasing over 
$3 million in counterfeit medications and billing Medicaid to increase their profits). 
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(Jul. 6, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2008/07/06/20080706drugs 
0706.html; see eAlert, Hughes Hubbard, Rare Criminal Prosecution Highlights Sales of 
Illegal and Counterfeit Drugs in the United States 2–3 (Apr. 2009), http://www.hugheshubb 
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X.  CONCLUSION 
The biopharmaceutical supply chain is a prime target for criminals 
seeking to profit off the weak and desperate. No one change will completely 
ensure healthcare system safety. An inclusive approach must be utilized. 
Counterfeiters must be discouraged at all points in international commerce.  
Detection and deterrence are critical factors. 
Biopharmaceuticals are important medications treating debilitating diseases 
that do not respond to traditional drugs. Because biologic treatments are 
expensive, there is abundant incentive to counterfeit these drugs. Tampering 
and diluting of biologics is often undetectable, necessitating the need for 
a comprehensive, international approach. 
Counterfeits may cross many borders and change hands several times 
before reaching the patients they are meant to treat. Immediate action and 
cooperation by individual countries is needed to ensure there are appropriate 
safety measures at each link in the supply chain. Many nations have 
implemented through laws to address the problem, however, a unified 
international approach is needed to be successful. 
Penalties for counterfeiters must have deterrent value to discourage trade 
in fake medications. Importers, distributors, and physicians purchasing what 
they hope is legitimate medication cannot be allowed to dissemble about 
the quality of questionable medicines. Many times fake drugs are easily 
identifiable with cursory diligence. There must be consequences to willful 
blindness when importers have reason to know it is likely they have counterfeits. 
There must also be an incentive component to the approach facilitating 
reporting of counterfeit events. 
With a streamlined and unified international approach guided by the 
WHO, the biopharmaceutical supply chain can be secured. It is a public 
health priority for the safety of patients who need these drugs the most 
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